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I.  Introduction: 
  
The walls that have maintained the privacy of man’s affairs for thousands of years have 
been made obsolete by his technological advances.  Law enforcement agencies now have at their 
disposal devices that allow an individual that is outside of a structure to hear conversations and 
see details that would be otherwise undiscoverable without the physical entry of that structure.  
As a result, where stone and mortar previously protected an individual’s privacy, he now must 
rely on the judicial bodies that society has entrusted to faithfully apply the Fourth Amendment.  
Unfortunately, one recent decision by the United States Supreme Court betrays the origin and 
jurisprudence of that amendment in such a way that the inhabitants of a non-residential structure 
cannot be confident that their privacy will not be legally eliminated. 
In June of 2001, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in the case of 
Kyllo v. United States.  Hailed as a victory by civil liberties advocates, the Court held that 
“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore 
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”1  However, in 
the wake of Kyllo it has become evident from lower court decisions that the above quoted 
passage has spawned an important, albeit narrow, question that largely remains unanswered.  
Specifically, the Court’s decision to single out the home in its holding has created uncertainty as 
to the protection afforded to non-residential structures from thermal imaging inspections.2  This 
paper will begin by briefly describing the technology that prompted the Court’s decision in 
Kyllo.  After analyzing the judicial approaches to warrantless thermal imaging before and after 
the Kyllo decision, this paper will ultimately argue that to the extent that Kyllo does not protect 
the non-residential structure from warrantless sense-enhanced surveillance, the Court’s holding 
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was in error3.  Specifically, just as the majority in Kyllo concluded that the history of the Fourth 
Amendment requires that the interior details of the home must be protected from sense-enhanced 
intrusions, this paper will demonstrate that history and jurisprudence also require the extension 
of the same protection to all structures in which there is a property interest.  
 
II.  Background: 
 
1.  The Technology Defined: 
  
Thermal imagers are camera like devices that are capable of detecting infrared radiation 
that is otherwise invisible to the human eye.4  The user of the device is able to visually see areas 
of heat and coolness, which the device displays through assigning different colors or shades of 
colors to various temperature ranges.5  When aimed at a structure, these devices display the 
radiation being emitted by the home, as opposed to the radiation levels actually inside the home.6  
This distinction has been explained by describing thermal imagers as conducting “off the wall” 
measurements as opposed to “through the wall” measurements.7  
 A thermal imaging device’s ability to visually depict otherwise invisible thermal 
radiation waves can be utilized by police officers that suspect a structure may contain a “grow 
room”.8  This term refers to a room in an ordinary structure that has been equipped with high-
intensity grow-lights and hydration systems so that an individual may grow marijuana indoors.9  
In police investigations of structures suspected of containing such rooms, an officer would 
typically aim the imaging device at the home from street level, or from an aircraft during a fly-
over.10  The thermal emissions from the suspected structure are then compared to the emissions 
from other similar, surrounding structures.11  If an intense area of thermal radiation is seen in the 
target structure and not in the comparison structures, a presumption can arise that the structure is 
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being used for the cultivation of marijuana.  This information, often coupled with records from 
the relevant utilities company, then forms the basis for the affidavit in support of a search 
warrant. 
Although the Court’s holding in Kyllo technically governs the use of all sense enhancing 
technology that is not in general public use, this paper will solely reference thermal imaging 
technology, as it was this type of device that was directly implicated in Kyllo and in its progeny.  
While it is true that post-Kyllo courts were frequently asked to decide whether the Kyllo decision 
applies to drug-detection dog searches, that issue has now been decided in the negative by the 
Supreme Court.12  As a result, the only form of sense-enhancing technology that is certainly 
affected by the Kyllo holding is the thermal imaging device.13 
 
2.  Judicial Treatment of Thermal Imaging Prior to the Kyllo Decision: 
 
 Prior to the decision in Kyllo, both Federal and State courts examined the use of thermal 
imaging devices on a number of occasions.  In analyzing whether or not such a device could be 
used without a warrant, courts would focus on whether the use of the device constituted a search 
under the test provided by Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States.14 
 In Katz v. United States, the petitioner was convicted of eight counts relating to illegal 
wagering15.  The key evidence for the government consisted of various recordings of the 
petitioner’s telephone calls that he had made from a public telephone booth.16  The FBI, 
suspecting that the petitioner was using the booth for illegal means, placed a listening device 
outside of the booth that enabled them to hear the petitioner’s side of the conversations.17   
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court explicitly declared the inapplicability of 
the trespass doctrine.18  Under the trespass doctrine, surveillance that occurred without a 
common law trespass did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.19  In a significant departure from 
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earlier jurisprudence, the Court stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not areas”.20  
As a result, the Court developed a new approach to Fourth Amendment questions, which was 
succinctly explained in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.  In order for the Fourth Amendment to be 
implicated by a search, Justice Harlan explained that “there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”21   Therefore, according 
to the majority, “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”22 
In applying the Katz test to the thermal imaging of a structure, early courts frequently 
held that there was no expectation of privacy in the heat emanating from the structure, or 
alternatively, that the expectation of privacy was not one that society was willing to recognize as 
reasonable.  While some courts focused on the fact that there could not be an expectation of 
privacy where a defendant did not seek to prevent the heat from escaping the structure, other 
courts indicated that because no beams or rays from the thermal image device penetrated the 
home, a search did not occur.  While the majority of these early cases involved residential 
structures, the opinions generally established that the warrantless use of thermal imagers was 
permissible in regards to both residential and non-residential structures.  Nearly every Federal 
Circuit approved of the use of this technology, and the small minority of state courts that 
prohibited the warrantless use of the devices generally did so based on state constitutional 
grounds, rather than invoke the Fourth Amendment and the Katz test.  
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3.  Kyllo and the Explicit Prohibition of Warrantless Thermal Imaging of a Home: 
 
 The Supreme Court first addressed law enforcement’s use of thermal imagers in Kyllo v. 
U.S.  The triplex in which Kyllo lived was targeted by a thermal imager after police suspected 
that it was being used as part of a marijuana growing operation.23  The scan, conducted from a 
law enforcement vehicle parked on the street, revealed that petitioner Kyllo’s garage and outer 
wall were significantly hotter than the other homes in his structure.24  This evidence, along with 
utility bills and confidential tips, were used to establish the probable cause that formed the basis 
for a search warrant which led to the discovery of a marijuana growing operation.25  
Upon the rejection of his motion to suppress, Kyllo entered a conditional guilty plea and 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which remanded for an evidentiary hearing.26  The District Court 
subsequently stated that the thermal imager “’is a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or 
beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house’; 
it ‘did not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure’; “[t]he device used 
cannot penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activities’; and ‘[n]o 
intimate details of the home were observed.”’27  As a result of these evidentiary findings, the 
District Court again denied the motion to suppress, and the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed 
over the dissent of one judge.28  The Circuit Court largely reasoned that there was not a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when the homeowner did not take steps to contain the escaped 
heat that produced the images.29  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit stressed the lack of intimate 
details that were revealed in the thermal images.30 
A divided Supreme Court reversed, specifically holding that “Where, as here, the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ 
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and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”31  Throughout the majority’s analysis, 
Justice Scalia made frequent reference to the challenged search having occurred at a home.  The 
Court stated that “We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to 
the house.’”32 The majority discussed the potential for this type of sense-enhancing technology to 
reveal intimate details of an individual’s life that occur within the home, such as “at what hour 
each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.”33  The Court explained that all 
details of the home are intimate and that it is therefore irrelevant what type of detail is revealed 
by the thermal imager34.  So long as the detail relates to the interior of the structure, a search has 
occurred.  While the Court referenced the holding of Dow Chemical v. U.S., which explains that 
the exteriors of industrial complexes are not likely to reveal intimate details that are 
constitutionally protected, Justice Scalia did not explicitly state that the interiors of non-
residential structures are not likewise presumed to be intimate.   
In reaching its holding, the Court rejected the notion that the “off the wall” nature of the 
thermal imaging surveillance could not be a search because it did not penetrate the structure.35  
Stating that such a mechanical application of the Fourth Amendment was contrary to the holding 
of Katz, the court explained that despite technically being true that the observations were “off the 
wall”, the details revealed by the search would not be discoverable absent a sense enhancing 
device or physical entry into the home.36  In so concluding, the court apparently rejected the 
findings of previous courts, which had focused on whether or not the individual sought to 
prevent the thermal energy from escaping the targeted structure. 
 
4.  Subsequent Interpretations of Kyllo’s Applicability to the Non-Residential Structure: 
 
 Approximately one year after the Court’s decision in Kyllo, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
were each faced with cases in which a criminal defendant sought the protection of Kyllo despite 
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the fact that the structure that was targeted by a thermal imager was not residential in nature.37  
The outcomes of these two cases indicate that the future legality of warrantless thermal imaging 
remains unclear.38 
 Just over one year after the Kyllo opinion was issued, the Sixth Circuit commented on the 
warrantless thermal imaging of non-residential structures in U.S. v. Elkins.  In Elkins, Memphis 
police were anonymously informed that several commercial structures belonging to James and 
Carol Elkins were being used for the cultivation of marijuana.39  Based on this tip, police officers 
conducted an overflight of three of the Elkinses’ properties.40  During these overflights, thermal 
imaging devices were used to measure the heat radiating from the structures.41  After discovering 
hot-spots which indicated the use of grow-lights in the structures, Police approached the Elkinses 
and sought their consent to search.42  Upon receiving consent, the structures were searched and a 
large-scale marijuana operation was uncovered.43   
The District Court held that the thermal imaging evidence was inadmissible as it was a 
warrantless search of the Elkinses premises, and as a result, also suppressed certain searches that 
occurred after the thermal imaging fly-over.44  On the government’s appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
stated that: 
 
While Kyllo broadly protects homes against warrantless thermal imaging, the case 
before us involves the use of a thermal imager to scan the Elkinses' commercial 
buildings. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy in business premises, yet it 
is less than the reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the home.  There is 
little federal precedent on the thermal imaging of commercial property, and none 
since Kyllo.45 
 
Stating that “Courts should avoid unnecessary constitutional questions”, the Sixth Circuit did not 
answer whether or not the thermal imaging violated the Fourth Amendment, as the issue could 
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be resolved by focusing on the Elkinses’ consent.46  So, while noting the novelty of the question, 
the Elkins Court left its resolution for another day.47 
 Three days after the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Elkins, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the question that Elkins chose to abstain from.48  In U.S. v. Johnson, law enforcement officials 
conducted an overflight of defendant Robert Johnson’s property.49  During the overflight, a 
thermal imager was used on a barn situated on the property.50  It is unclear whether the device 
was ever focused on the defendant’s residence.51  The district court, finding that the barn was not 
used as a home by either of two defendants, held that the overflight and thermal imaging did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.52  A unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  In a short, 
unpublished opinion, the court held that the district court’s finding that the barn was not used as 
a home was not clearly erroneous, and thus the use of the thermal imager on the barn was not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment because “Kyllo applies only to a home.”53  The holding 
partially rested on the decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., in which the Supreme Court 
described the lower privacy expectation that is afforded to non-residential structures.54 
 In addition to the federal circuit courts mentioned above, several state courts have also 
addressed this issue.55  Among these state court decisions, there have been a variety of 
conclusions.  While some courts have reacted similarly to the Sixth Circuit and stated that the 
solution is unclear, others have followed the Ninth Circuit’s logic and declared that Kyllo only 
applies to the home.56  However, unlike the federal courts, a small number of state courts have 
held that Kyllo applies to all structures for which a warrant would be needed to enter.57 
 Both Connecticut and California state courts have declared that it is unclear whether or 
not non-residential structures are protected from warrantless thermal imaging.  In State v. 
Mordowanec, law enforcement authorities utilized a thermal imager to scan a suspect’s 
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commercial property.58  The data from this scan, along with other evidence, was submitted in the 
affidavit that secured a search warrant.59  The Supreme Court of Connecticut stated: 
 
The Kyllo decision did not address the question of whether a search warrant 
would be required to conduct a thermal imaging scan of premises other than a 
home, such as a commercial property. The court emphasized, however, the 
heightened expectation of privacy in one's home and distinguished that 
heightened expectation from the lesser expectation of privacy in a commercial 
property.60 
 
While this language seems to indicate that the Court does not believe that Kyllo applies to non-
residential structures, the court passed on the question, holding that absent the thermal imaging 
data, the warrant was still supported by sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.61 
 In People v. Keppeler, which involved the thermal imaging of a barn in which nobody 
lived, the California Court of Appeals stated in an unpublished opinion that “the issue of whether 
thermal imaging of a barn is subject to the Kyllo rule is still an open question.”62  Like 
Mordowanec, the court did not decide the issue, but found that the Leon good faith exception 
applied to the warrant.63 
 The courts of at least four states, Wyoming, Texas, Illinois, and Iowa, have indicated that 
Kyllo should be interpreted to protect only homes from sense-enhanced surveillance.  However, 
of these states, only Wyoming has actually ruled on a case that involved a thermal imager, while 
the other three states interpreted Kyllo in light of challenges to sniff searches conducted by drug 
dogs. 
 In Kitzke v. State, Petitioner brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
his attorney’s failure to file a motion to suppress in regards to thermal imager evidence that was 
gathered from a series of non-residential buildings that were being used in a marijuana growing 
operation.64  The Supreme Court of Wyoming chose not to address the issue for a number of 
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reasons, stating that the inconclusive thermal imaging evidence added nothing to the search 
warrant; the search was conducted before the Kyllo opinion was issued, and, most relevant to this 
paper, “the device was not used on Kitzke's residence.”65 
 As mentioned above, three states have discussed the applicability of Kyllo to non-
residential structures in the context of investigations conducted with the aid of drug-detection 
dogs.  In each of these instances, criminal defendants whose property was the target of drug-
sniffing dogs argued that the dogs should be considered sense-enhancing technology, like a 
thermal imager, because they are able to detect what would otherwise be undetectable.  In each 
of these instances, the targeted property was not a home.  The Supreme Court of Iowa, along 
with the courts of appeals of Texas and Illinois, stated that Kyllo only applies to a home, 
therefore the property targeted by the dogs could not be granted Fourth Amendment protection 
under the sense-enhancing argument.  While these holdings may indicate that these courts would 
likewise uphold a warrantless thermal imaging of a non-residential structure, it is possible that 
future courts in these jurisdictions would view the drug-sniffing cases as factually distinct.   
Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of the United States also recently held that 
Kyllo does not prohibit dog-sniff searches.  In Illinois v. Caballes, the court reasoned that 
because a drug sniffing dog only reveals illegal contraband, the legitimate privacy interests being 
protected in Kyllo were not compromised by the use of the dogs. 
 In addition to the states discussed above, two states, Alaska and Idaho, have indicated 
that non-residential structures are protected by the Court’s prohibition in Kyllo.  In Johnston v. 
State, the Court of Appeals of Alaska reviewed a denied suppression motion that sought to 
exclude evidence resulting from a search warrant obtained after the thermal imaging of the 
defendant’s home and commercial structure.66  The facts indicated that the affidavit in support of 
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the warrant did not include the data from the thermal imager, and this evidence was not 
considered by the judge that issued the warrant.67  After discussing Kyllo, The Court of Appeals 
remanded to the trial court to determine whether the evidence forming the basis for the warrant 
was the result of an investigation that became more focused because of the “illegal search”.68  
While the court did not explicitly hold that the thermal imaging of a non-residential structure 
was prohibited by Kyllo, its decision to remand indicates that had the thermal imaging evidence 
formed the basis of the warrant, the warrant would be invalid. 
 In what is the most explicit statement from any court regarding the warrantles thermal 
imaging of a non-residential structure, the Iowa Court of Appeals stated in State v. Schumacher, 
that “Based upon this determination by the United States Supreme Court [referencing the 
decision in Kyllo], the thermal imaging of Schumacher's barn was an unlawful search, and the 
resulting evidence may not be used to support the issuance of a search warrant or employed 
against Schumacher in a trial.”69  The court further explained that “The Fourth Amendment 
prohibits warrantless searches of premises where the defendant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.”70  Therefore, because 
Schumacher had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his barn, and because the thermal imaging 
was conducted without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment was violated.71  The Iowa Court of 
Appeals reinforced this principle in Woodward v. State, an ineffective assistance of counsel case, 
in which the court discussed the illegal thermal imaging of a pole building near the residence of 
the defendant.72 
 The state and federal authority in the wake of Kyllo demonstrates the confusion that 
surrounds the lengths to which Kyllo Court intended its holding to reach.  As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, while it appears that the majority in Kyllo only sought to 
 12
protect the home from sense-enhancing technology, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demands 
that the scope of Kyllo’s protection extend further. 
 
III.  Analysis: 
 
1.  Did the Kyllo Court Intend to Prohibit Thermal Imaging of a Non-Residential 
Structure? 
 
 As demonstrated in the above section, it is uncertain whether or not the Kyllo Court 
intended to protect all structures from warrantless thermal imaging, or simply intended to protect 
the homeowner from such incursions.  However, there certainly appears to be sufficient evidence 
to conclude that the home is the only structure protected by Kyllo.  The majority opinion in Kyllo 
largely appears to be focused on the intimate details of the home that are vulnerable in the face 
of growing technology.  While stating that the “Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the 
entrance to the house,’” Justice Scalia cites to the original intent of the Framers in drafting the 
amendment.73  Furthermore, Justice Scalia states “we must take the long view, from the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment”, again indicating that the historical roots of the Amendment 
are essential to answering the question.74  After establishing that the Court intends to protect the 
intimate details of the home from the thermal imager, the Court explains that all details of the 
home are intimate and contrasts this with the case of the industrial facility, citing to Dow 
Chemical Co. v. U.S.75  Though the Court does not explicitly state that an industrial facility 
would not be protected from thermal imaging, it certainly implies that this is this case.   
Had the Court intended to apply its prohibition of warrantless thermal imaging to all 
structures, it seems that it would have made that simple statement, rather than focus so intently 
on the special place that the home has occupied in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  While it 
could be argued that the Court in Kyllo limited its holding to the home because it sought to only 
 13
answer the question posed by the controversy at hand, such an argument is unpersuasive.  The 
majority certainly did not demonstrate judicial restraint when it allowed its holding to address 
any form of sense-enhancing technology despite the fact that the case at hand only dealt with the 
thermal imager.  Just as the court crafted an expansive holding in the types of technology it 
addressed, it could have similarly expanded its holding to deal with all forms of structures, rather 
than just speak towards the structure involved in the specific fact pattern presented.  
Based on the specificity of Justice Scalia’s language in the majority opinion, it naturally 
follows that subsequent courts have interpreted Kyllo to only protect the home.  Furthermore, 
Justice Scalia’s mentions of history, though brief in comparison to some of his other opinions, 
are certainly relevant in the interpretation of Kyllo’s holding.  Justice Scalia frequently applies an 
originalist approach in analyzing whether or not a particular right should be afforded to the 
citizenry.76  In his view, in order to recognize a constitutional right, the basis for the claimed 
right must be anchored in the history and tradition of the nation, dating back to the adoption of 
the Constitution.  Therefore, when Justice Scalia invokes history in the Kyllo opinion, he is 
essentially seeking to discover whether the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
requires the Court to protect the home from warrantless thermal imaging.  While Justice Scalia 
concludes that this understanding does protect the home from such searches, by citing to Dow 
Chemical, he implies that other structures may not be deserving of similar protection.  However, 
a similar analysis of the history and tradition of the Fourth Amendment reveals that the 
protection afforded to non-residential structures, particularly when the interiors of those 
structures are implicated, is significant.  
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2.  The Rationale of Kyllo Supports Protecting the Non-Residential Structure 
 As explained above, the outcome of Kyllo is the result of the Court’s consideration of two 
primary factors: the historical significance of the home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
in the drafting of that amendment and the intimate nature of the details of the interior of the 
home.  An analysis of relevant Supreme Court precedent establishes that these factors also 
support extending the protection of Kyllo to the non-residential structure.  The Supreme Court 
and the Framers of the Constitution have historically protected the non-residential structure from 
warrantless intrusion.  Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has indicated that details of the 
exterior of a non-residential structure are to be afforded lesser Fourth Amendment protection 
than the home, it is equally clear that the interior details of a structure in which a person has a 
privacy interest are afforded Fourth amendment protection regardless of the type of structure 
involved.  Stated differently, Kyllo’s emphasis on the “intimate” nature of the interior of the 
home contradicts the Supreme Court’s recent holdings that address law enforcement’s utilization 
of technological advancements.  These recent holdings indicate that where the non-residential 
structure is concerned, unless the technology utilized for the surveillance is so narrow that it is 
only able to detect illegal activity or contraband, a search has occurred and thus the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated.   
 
A.  Historical Protection of Commercial Structures and Outbuildings: 
 While the majority in Kyllo is definitely correct to cite to the historical importance of the 
home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this fact alone should not lead one to conclude that 
non-residential structures should not be protected from thermal imager surveillance.  It is a long 
established principle that the Fourth Amendment does not just apply to the home.  Rather, the 
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Supreme Court has recognized that there a various locations outside the walls of the home for 
which citizens have legitimate privacy expectations recognized by society.  In light of the 
holding in Katz, any structure can be granted Fourth Amendment protection so long as it passes 
the two part test described by Justice Harlan.  Most important for the purposes of the thermal 
imaging controversy are commercial structures, and outbuildings of the home (such as detached 
garages, barns, sheds, and other pole buildings), which can be located inside or outside of the 
curtilage. 
 While the dicta of some Fourth Amendment cases may indicate that the home is 
historically afforded more Fourth Amendment protection than a commercial structure, both 
classes of buildings are generally protected to the same degree absent one specialized exception 
that is unique in the commercial setting.77  This principle was explained in 1977, when the 
Supreme Court decided G.M. Leasing Corp. v. U.S.  In G.M., Plaintiff brought suit against the 
Unites States as a result of the I.R.S. entering and seizing commercial property without a warrant 
in order to account for unpaid tax liabilities.78  The Government argued that the warrant 
requirement should not apply to the commercial property, as such property is not historically 
protected to the same degree as the home.79  The Court recognized that such an argument is 
commonly presented, but explained that absent special situations, commercial property is 
protected by legitimate privacy interests.80  In rejecting the Government’s contention that a 
particular statutory exception to the tax code allowed for the seizure, the court declared “The 
intrusion into petitioner's office is therefore governed by the normal Fourth Amendment rule that 
‘except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper 
consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”’81  The Court 
further explained “that a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself 
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to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context… In the present case, 
however, the intrusion into petitioner's privacy was not based on the nature of its business, its 
license, or any regulation of its activities.”82  Finding that no search warrant exception applied 
for the plaintiff’s commercial structure, the court held that the Government violated the Fourth 
Amendment when it entered the property for the purpose of the seizure.83 
In order for the special commercial structure search warrant exception to apply, the entity 
operating the structure must have been involved in a heavily regulated industry that is subject to 
such strict governmental control that invoking the warrant requirement would prove to be overly 
burdensome.84  For example, this exception is generally recognized for entities involved in the 
sale or manufacture of firearms or alcohol.85    The Supreme Court has been very strict in 
recognizing special exceptions to the warrant requirement for commercial structures.  In 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Court heard a challenge to the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act of 1970.86  One section of that act permitted agents of the Secretary of Labor to search 
entities covered by OSHA in order to identify and prevent violations of that act and other safety 
hazards.87  In holding the provision unconstitutional, the court reasoned that while there is a 
narrow exception to the warrant requirement in the context of commercial structures, to expand 
that exception would reduce the historical importance placed on the privacy right of the 
businessman.88  The court stated that “it is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not 
intended to shield places of business as well as of residence.”89  Furthermore, the court explained 
that this conclusion was not merely the product of modern jurisprudence.  Rather, the protection 
afforded the commercial structure in our legal tradition predates the Fourth Amendment.  As the 
Court stated, “The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as 
well as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the 
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American colonial experience.”90  The Court continued by explaining that the Virginia Bill of 
Rights, a document from which much of our Bill of Rights was modeled, included a prohibition 
against general warrants, which was intended to protect commercial as well as residential 
structures.91  
As stated in Camara v. Municipal Court, “except in certain carefully defined classes of 
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been 
authorized by a valid search warrant.”92  So, while it is conceivable that a commercial structure 
targeted by a thermal imaging device may meet the special criteria required to lessen its owner’s 
privacy expectation, in such an instance the law enforcement agency would be permitted to enter 
the building outright, and the use of the thermal imager would serve little purpose.   
Just as commercial structures have historically been protected from warrantless searches, 
so too have outbuildings of a home.  When analyzing a search of an outbuilding, modern 
jurisprudence requires an analysis of whether or not the structure is within the curtilage of a 
home.  As stated in Dow Chemical, “The curtilage area immediately surrounding a private house 
has long been given protection as a place where the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept.”93  This development in modern 
jurisprudence, which is rooted in common law notions, recognizes that the intimate activities 
associated with a home, those activities that the majority sought to protect in Kyllo, occur not 
only in the home, but also in the area immediately surrounding the home.94  Although limited by 
the plain view doctrine, the recognition of the privacy expectation in the curtilage of the home is 
an expansive protection.95     
As the notion of curtilage developed more fully, the Court drew a distinction between the 
curtilage and open fields, which are those areas outside of the curtilage and which are, 
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consequently, afforded little Fourth Amendment protection.96  As stated in Oliver, “an individual 
may not legitimately demand privacy for activities out of doors in fields, except in the area 
immediately surrounding the home.”97  Though there is no bright-line rule that establishes what 
is or is not within the curtilage of a home, the Court in Dunn listed four factors that are relevant 
to the determination: “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the 
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the 
area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people 
passing by.”98 
If, when the Dunn factors are applied, an outbuilding is determined to be inside the 
curtilage of the home, that building is to be afforded the same protection as the home.  Such 
structures cannot be entered without a warrant unless one of the traditional exceptions to the 
warrant requirement applies.99  This principle was explained in Walker v. U.S., in which law 
enforcement agents suspecting that a barn was being used for the illegal distillation of spirits, 
entered the barn which was determined to be within the curtilage of the home.100  The Court 
determined that because the barn was within the curtilage, a warrant was required in the absence 
of exigent circumstances.101   
Considering the historical treatment given to outbuildings inside of the curtilage, it would 
seem that even Justice Scalia would have to concede that the warrantless thermal imaging of 
these structures would be unconstitutional.  If the majority in Kyllo was most concerned with 
protecting the intimate details of the home, it follows that if the rationale for protecting the 
curtilage is that it is also associated with intimate details, than any structure in the curtilage 
should be equally protected from the revealing capabilities of the thermal imager.  
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If the concerned outbuilding is not determined to be within the curtilage, it does not 
automatically follow that no Fourth Amendment protection exists.  Rather, in these 
circumstances, the traditional Katz test still applies.  Therefore, a court in such an instance should 
first determine whether or not the owner of the structure exhibited a subjective expectation of 
privacy, and if so, whether that expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable.   
 It naturally follows that if an outbuilding is not located within the curtilage of a home, 
than it is in an open field.  As a result, as seen in Dunn, law enforcement agents are permitted to 
walk directly to the structure and even peer inside any open portions of the structure.  Therefore, 
in order to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the interior use of such a structure, it 
seems to follow that the interior must be completely shielded from the view of anyone outside 
the structure.  In such an instance, because the use of a thermal imager could reveal details for 
which there was a legitimate expectation of privacy, the use of the device should be considered a 
search. 
 As described above, courts have historically recognized that an individual can have a 
legitimate privacy expectation in a commercial building or outbuilding.  Like all Fourth 
Amendment questions, each challenged search must be analyzed on a case by case basis.  While 
a court will presume that a legitimate privacy interest exists in the home or other structure in the 
curtilage, commercial structures and outbuildings in open fields can be similarly protected if the 
Katz test is satisfied.  
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B.  Supreme Court Precedent establishes that the Interiors of Fourth Amendment 
Protected Structures Must be Shielded from Technological Encroachments 
 
Not only does precedent demonstrate that legitimate privacy expectations in non-
residential structures are ingrained in the history and tradition of this country, it similarly 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to allow technology to reduce privacy 
expectations in the interiors of structures in which an individual has a property interest.  Limiting 
Fourth Amendment protection of warrantless thermal imaging to instances in which a residential 
structure or an intimate detail is the target of the search would be contrary to the principles 
explained by the Supreme Court in other technology related Fourth Amendment cases.   
The Katz test described in Justice Harlan’s concurrence has been criticized for its circular 
nature and potentially corrosive effect.102  By defining the term “search” in the context of the 
expectations of the individual and society, it seems that privacy rights could eventually erode as 
new technologies diminish the circumstances in which we can be confident that we are not being 
listened to or watched.  These concerns have surfaced in the Supreme Court in the last two 
decades.  In this period of time, the Court has essentially ensured that though the Fourth 
Amendment may grant special protections to the home, the interiors of all structures in which 
there is a legitimate privacy interest should be protected from the growing reaches of technology. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Karo, a case in which law enforcement 
agents received a tip from a government informant that a certain barrel of ether was being 
purchased to eventually extract cocaine from clothing fibers.103  Based on the tip, agents placed a 
beeper device inside of the barrel.104  This beeper enabled agents to track the location of the 
barrel as it moved to various houses and commercial storage facilities that were associated with 
the defendants (while the barrel was in the storage facilities, the beeper was capable of revealing 
its general location, but not the specific locker in which it had been placed).105  In issuing a 
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search warrant, the judge, in part, relied on evidence that showed that the can of ether had been 
inside two of the defendants’ homes.106  The Supreme Court held that while placing the beeper in 
the can of ether did not violate the Fourth Amendment, monitoring the location of the beeper 
while it was in the various residential locations did constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.107  The Court reasoned that the beeper technology essentially allowed the agents to 
learn details of the interior of the protected locations that could not otherwise be learned without 
actually entering those locations.108  As the Court stated, “Indiscriminate monitoring of property 
that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy 
interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.”109  In 
regards to the surveillance that occurred while the beeper was in the commercial storage 
facilities, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated, because the 
defendants’ had no privacy expectation in the storage facility.110  Rather, the defendants’ privacy 
expectation was only in their specific locker, the identity of which the beeper was not capable of 
revealing.  The Court stated that “Had the monitoring disclosed the presence of the container 
within a particular locker the result would be otherwise, for surely Horton and Harley had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their own storage locker.”111  Therefore, the monitoring of 
such a beeper is not solely improper when the beeper is located in a home, but when it is in any 
location in which the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy.  Furthermore, the notion 
of intimacy is not contemplated in Karo.  The majority is simply not concerned with the nature 
of the details that could be revealed by technology.  Rather, the mere fact that any detail could be 
revealed that would otherwise be undiscoverable is of sufficient importance for the court to 
invoke the Fourth Amendment.          
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 Two years after Karo, the Court decided two distinguishable cases that deal with aerial 
surveillance.  A review of these holdings further demonstrates the protections afforded to the 
interiors of non-residential structures, and also sheds light on how the Kyllo Court erroneously 
concluded that the interior details of the home are somehow more constitutionally significant 
than the details of other structures.  First, in California v. Ciraolo, the Court held that naked-eye 
observations of the curtilage of a suspect’s home was constitutional when those observations 
were made from a plane flying in publicly navigable airspace.112  The Court stated:  
In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it 
is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were 
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an 
altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police 
traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to 
observe what is visible to the naked eye.113 
 
This statement both indicates the sliding scale of privacy that has resulted from the Katz 
standard, and the concern the Court has for the sanctity of the home under the Fourth 
Amendment.   
 On the same day that the Court issued its opinion in Ciraolo, it also issued its opinion in 
Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., in which the chemical company sought injunctive relief to prevent 
the EPA from conducting aerial surveillance of their facilities in which enhanced photography 
technology was employed.114  While the court held that such enhanced visual surveillance did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, the majority qualified this holding with a number of 
statements that indicate that the outcome was dependant on the facts that the enhanced 
surveillance was of an industrial, not residential, structure, and that the enhancements only aided 
the EPA in observing exterior details of the structure.  The court stated “We find it important that 
this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most 
heightened.”115  Furthermore, in comparing the holdings of Dow Chemical and Ciraolo, the 
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Court said “The intimate activities associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage 
simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a 
manufacturing plant.”116  In reference to the nature of the surveillance, the majority stated 
“Although they [the enhanced photographs] undoubtedly give EPA more detailed information 
than naked-eye views, they remain limited to an outline of [the exterior of] the facility's 
buildings and equipment.”117  The Court continued to explain that “Dow plainly has a 
reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered 
buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to observe.”118  
Finally, the Court recognized that “An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows so as to 
hear and record confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other trade secrets would raise 
very different and far more serious questions.”119  
 When taken together, the Ciraolo and Dow Chemical cases demonstrate that while the 
Court approves of naked-eye aerial surveillance of a home, aerial surveillance enhanced by the 
aid of photography is only appropriate where the targeted property is not residential and thus not 
associated with the intimate details of a person’s life120.  However, a more extensive reading 
reveals that even in the case of a non-residential structure, Dow Chemical’s protection of 
technology aided surveillance only extends to the exterior of such structures.  This, of course, is 
consistent with Karo’s prohibition of technology aided observations of otherwise unobservable 
details of the interior of a protected location.  It would appear, however, that the majority in 
Kyllo failed to truly understand the relevance of the distinction between Ciraolo and Dow 
Chemical.  While the superficial (or perhaps selective) reading of those cases may lead to the 
conclusion that the industrial facility is less protected than the home for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, the reality is that Dow Chemical in no way diminished the privacy expectation in the 
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interior of the non-residential structure.  To the contrary, the Court reaffirmed that the interior of 
a non-residential structure must not be warrantlessly breached, and, like Karo, did so without 
reference to intimacy.  Thus a court’s consideration of Dow Chemical should lead to the 
prohibition of warrantless thermal imaging of the non-residential structure, because, as Justice 
Scalia explained, the details revealed by that device solely concern the interior of the structure. 
 To hold that a non-residential structure is not protected from warrantless thermal imaging 
is contrary to the above described jurisprudence.  As described previously, the court in Kyllo 
rejected the notion that monitoring thermal waves radiating “off the wall” was not a search 
because the interior of the structure was not in any way penetrated.  Furthermore, any notion that 
the details of the interior of a home are more intimate and thus more deserving of Fourth 
Amendment protection is simply not grounded in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.121  This 
mechanical application of the Fourth Amendment would ignore the reality that such searches can 
reveal interior details that are otherwise unobservable.  Just as Karo and Dow Chemical drew the 
line at the interior of structures for technology aided surveillance, regardless of whether the 
structure was residential or not, judicial consistency requires the same conclusion in regards to 
thermal imaging devices.  
IV.  Conclusion: 
In light of the Supreme Court’s synthesized jurisprudence, if this paper and the Ninth 
Circuit are correct and the Kyllo rule only protects a residential structure from the intrusion of a 
thermal imaging device, it becomes evident that the Kyllo Court’s limited holding is contrary to 
Fourth Amendment principles.  Because courts have recognized that an individual can have a 
legitimate privacy expectation in the interior of a non-residential structure so that the Katz test is 
satisfied, it follows that the use of a thermal imager implicates the Fourth Amendment if it 
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reveals details of the interior of the structure.  While the Court may distinguish the details of a 
home by classifying them as “intimate”, a property owner may use his private property towards 
whatever legal ends he sees fit, regardless of whether that property is his home, business, or barn.  
Additionally, the notion that the interior of a structure is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
only if that structure is associated with intimate details, like the time of night that an individual 
bathes, is contrary to the holdings of Dow Chemical, Karo and Barlow’s, Inc.  If the notion of 
intimacy that is seen in Kyllo had been embraced by the courts that decided those cases, the 
outcomes would have likely been very different. 
  As the Kyllo court acknowledged, the “off the wall” nature of the thermal imaging scan 
essentially reveals details that would require physical entry to discover.  Thus the proper holding 
would have been that the warrantless use of sense enhancing technology for the purpose of 
discovering details about a structure that would be otherwise undiscoverable without physical 
presence inside the structure is violative of the Fourth Amendment where a private citizen has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the targeted structure and no other exception to the search 
warrant requirement exists.  This standard would also have to comply with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Caballes.  Therefore, if some sort of sense enhancing technology were developed 
which detected nothing but the presence of contraband or illegal activity, the warrantless use of 
that technology would be permissible regardless of whether or not it targeted a structure in which 
there was a legitimate privacy expectation. 
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